Organic Tradition or Imperial Glory? Contradictions and Continuity of Russian Identity Politics by Morozov, Viacheslav
No. 198
analytical
digest
14 February 2017
IDENTITY POLITICS
russian
www.laender-analysen.de
German Association for
East European Studies
Research Centre 
for East European Studies 
University of Bremen
Institute of History
University of Zurich
Center for 
Security Studies 
ETH Zurich
Institute for European, 
Russian, and Eurasian Studies
The George Washington 
University
www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html
■■ ANALYSIS
Ukraine’s Vendée War? 
A Look at the “Resistance Identity” of the Donbass Insurgency 2
Bruno De Cordier, Ghent
■■ ANALYSIS
Organic Tradition or Imperial Glory?  
Contradictions and Continuity of Russian Identity Politics 6
Viatcheslav Morozov, Tartu
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 198, 14 February 2017 6
About the Author
Bruno De Cordier is a professor at the Department of Conflict and Development Studies under the Faculty of Polit-
ical and Social Sciences of Ghent University.
Recommended Reading
• Hiroaki Kuromia, Freedom and terror in the Donbas—a Ukrainian-Russian borderland, 1870s–1990s. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
• Länder-Analysen und Democratic Initiatives Foundation, “Umfrage: Die ukrainische Bevölkerung zum Don-
bass-Konflikt”. Ukraine-Analysen, Nr. 150, 2015, <www.laender-analysen.de/ukraine/pdf/ukraineanalysen150.
pdf>
• For a partisan view on how the current policies of the Ukrainian government amount to the colonization of the 
country, see Simon Uralow, “Ziele der USA und Hauptaufgaben von Saakaschwili in Odessa”. Réseau Voltaire, 15. 
Juni 2015, <www.voltairenet.org/article187883.html>
• For insurgent or pro-insurgent views: 
• <novorossia.today/de/>, 
• <slavyangrad.de>
ANALYSIS
Organic Tradition or Imperial Glory?  
Contradictions and Continuity of Russian Identity Politics
Viatcheslav Morozov, Tartu
Abstract
Russian identity politics and, more broadly, the country’s development in modern times has been condi-
tioned by two constitutive splits: between the imperial elites and the peasant masses, on the one hand, and 
between Russia and Europe, on the other. The current conservative turn aims to overcome the internal 
split by attuning state policy to mass consciousness, with its alleged preference for ‘traditional values’. This 
strategy ignores the fact that today’s Russia is a modern, urbanised society. In the long run, it undermines 
the Kremlin’s effort to achieve and consolidate great power status.
Contemporary Russian identity politics is a  rather peculiar combination of familiar elements. Since 
2012, the official discourse emphasises ‘traditional values’ 
and ‘spiritual bonds’, thus referring to the presumed exist-
ence of a genuine Russian culture and spirit, uncontam-
inated by the centuries of Westernising modernisation. 
At the same time, the Russian state continues to claim 
continuity with its imperial predecessors, which involves 
a civilising mission in relation to its own population as 
well as a claim to the status of great power and to a prom-
inent role in world affairs. The importance of the latter 
dimension was raised by the interventions in Ukraine and 
Syria, while the resulting standoff with the West intensi-
fied the search for a ‘truly Russian’ Self. The attempts to 
artificially fuse the imperial and the traditionalist-nativ-
ist narratives are not entirely unprecedented, but have 
never been particularly successful in the past.
A European Empire vs. the Organic 
Tradition
In order to appreciate the difficulty of bridging differ-
ent identity narratives, historical background is abso-
lutely essential. Russia’s development in modern times 
has been fundamentally conditioned by two consti-
tutive splits: between the imperial elites and the peas-
ant masses, on the one hand, and between Russia and 
Europe, on the other. According to Geoffrey Hosk-
ing, the first split originates in the division between 
the nobility, who had an obligation to serve the crown 
in the army or the bureaucracy, and the taxed popu-
lation. It was introduced by the state in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, but solidified under Peter I, 
who forced the elites to adopt European culture and 
customs. As Alexander Etkind points out, this created 
a deep divide between the Europeanised, ‘shaven’ Rus-
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sians and their ‘bearded’ compatriots, to the extent that 
their relations are best described as those between colo-
nisers and colonised.
These developments were driven largely by foreign 
and security policy considerations. Russia’s territory has 
always been vulnerable to external invaders. The ascent 
of Western Europe, driven by technological and socie-
tal innovation, made Russia feel increasingly exposed 
on that flank, creating incentives for Europeanisation as 
a way of catching up with the most advanced countries. 
However, as Leon Trotsky was first to clearly demon-
strate, the geopolitical ‘whip of external necessity’ did 
not result in a smooth transplantation of ‘progressive’ 
European institutions. Rather, Russia followed a pat-
tern of what Trotsky termed ‘combined development’: 
institutional borrowings were adjusted to the needs of 
a vast empire whose primary task was to control its 
diverse populations and to mobilise resources for the 
continuous military effort.
One could argue that combined development was 
responsible for fact that Russia has never been able to 
fully integrate into the European civilisational space. 
Iver Neumann has argued that in their hegemonic posi-
tion, West Europeans have always been very sensitive to 
the ways in which other countries were governed: Rus-
sia’s authoritarian governance was looked upon with 
suspicion and contempt, and often presented as a threat 
to the entire European liberal order. The reasons for 
this suspicion are easy to reconstruct by following the 
present-day discussion about Moscow’s subversive pol-
icies in relation to Western democracies. This was the 
origin of the second major divide mentioned above, 
between Russia and (the rest of) Europe.
Both splits had constitutive significance for Rus-
sian identity. Essentially, the key identity problem Rus-
sia has faced since the eighteenth century is whether 
to Europeanise further, in the hope of eliminating the 
difference with Europe, or to turn its back to the West 
and rebuild the society around traditional values, with 
the elites abandoning their unnecessarily sophisticated 
culture and embracing a simpler lifestyle of the masses. 
The first option has always been extremely attractive not 
just because of the chance to become fully recognised 
as a European great power, but also as a way to create 
robust institutions rooted in civil society and thus capa-
ble of reigning in the omnipotent, corrupt bureaucracy. 
Yet this was also risky, since grassroots mobilisation 
threatened the integrity of the empire, where ethnic Rus-
sians constituted less than half of the total population. 
Even those ethnic Russians were predominantly peas-
ants, culturally alienated from the elites and believed 
to be unpredictable and prone to rebellion. Finally, the 
elites were also increasingly fragmented: the emergence 
of the democratic intelligentsia by the mid-nineteenth 
century signified a radical challenge to the legitimacy 
of the state and a growing fragmentation of the public 
space into mutually hostile circles and groupings.
The second option—going with the people away 
from Europe—looked safer at first glance but implied 
forsaking or at least postponing social modernisation. 
This inevitably put Russia under Trotsky’s ‘whip of exter-
nal necessity’. Another, subtler but eventually more fatal, 
difficulty consisted in the fact that the people were not 
properly represented in the discursive and political space. 
The peasants were largely illiterate and did not pos-
sess the means to express their ‘traditional values’ in 
a way that would enable their political operationali-
sation. Instead, these values were mostly imagined by 
the intellectuals, and in particular by the great nine-
teenth-century Russian literature. This gap began to 
close down in the early twentieth century, but it cer-
tainly would be an exaggeration to say that we know 
much about the peasants’ view of an ideal society, or, 
indeed, even to claim that peasants shared any compre-
hensive social utopia going any further than contradic-
tory common-sense views.
Viewed against this background, the current turn 
in Russian identity politics might seem to be a repeti-
tion of the old pattern of conservative reaction follow-
ing the most recent round of painful and destabilising 
reforms. However, the current situation is distinct in at 
least one crucial respect.
Traditionalist Identity for a Modern Society?
As pointed out above, imperial Russia was a deeply frac-
tured society, where the distance between the elites and 
the masses was so huge that the state effectively had to 
embark on a civilising—or colonising—mission in rela-
tion to its own population, including ethnic Russians. 
However, the Soviet Union managed to largely complete 
this mission in relation to the imperial core, roughly con-
sisting of the European part of the Russian Federation 
(except for North Caucasus), Belarus, Eastern Ukraine 
and urbanised spaces in Siberia, Kazakhstan and the 
Far East. Social mobility and displacement caused by 
the Soviet modernisation and totalitarian repression lev-
elled legal and cultural barriers between social groups. 
The new hierarchies that came to replace the tsarist ones 
were much less steep; in addition they were again trans-
formed by the Soviet collapse. Most importantly, how-
ever, the Soviets introduced universal standardised sec-
ondary education and developed a mass culture that 
appealed, and was available, to all social strata.
As a result, the post-Soviet Russian society is much 
more homogenous than any of its predecessors. This is 
not to say that there is no inequality or that class dif-
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ferences have no cultural markers. However, when it 
comes to questions of national identity, any two Russians 
would always be able to engage in a conversation and 
they would be using largely the same discursive codes.
It is impossible to imagine such a conversation in the 
nineteenth century between an intellectual and a peas-
ant: when the Russian populists decided to ‘go to the 
people’ in the 1870s, it took a lot of time and effort even 
to begin to establish a common language and the trust 
needed to discuss politics. However, the topics of today’s 
conversation would be largely the same that were dis-
cussed by the nineteenth-century Slavophiles and West-
ernisers, as well as their successors: is Russia a European 
country? Should it try to catch up with the West or go 
its own way? Should it be proud or ashamed of its dif-
ference from Europe?
Hardly anyone in Russia or beyond would deny the 
fact that there continue to exist significant differences 
between Russia and most of the EU-Europe when it 
comes to how the society is governed, the design and 
quality of institutions, certain behavioural patterns and 
so on. This is hardly surprising, given that the country 
has never been able to break away from the vicious cir-
cle of dependent, semi-peripheral development. Stalinist 
modernisation was in this respect a huge leap forward, 
but it was mostly based on imported technology (which 
was exchanged for grain expropriated from the peasants). 
Late Soviet Union developed an oil addiction, which 
became even more acute in the post-Soviet period. The 
state’s reliance on rents rather than taxes distorts popu-
lar representation, undermines democratic accountabil-
ity and produces widespread corruption.
While a majority of political and intellectual leaders 
of contemporary Russia would perhaps agree with the 
diagnosis, most of them stop short of embracing any rad-
ical reform. They do it for the same reason their prede-
cessors did in the nineteenth century: they do not trust 
their own people. There is a fear that grassroots activism, 
unless closely supervised by the state, is prone to result 
in chaos and destruction. This view is sustained by the 
interpretation of the 1990s as a  ‘dark age’ in Russia’s 
recent history, a modern time of troubles, as well as by 
the conspirological idea that the West will use any weak-
ness of the state to stage a ‘colour revolution’ in Moscow.
Thus, instead of talking to the Russian people as 
enlightened peers, the conservative elites prefer to see 
them as nineteenth-century peasants who could and 
should be kept in check through the promotion of Ortho-
dox religion, traditional family and a ‘patriotic’ view or 
history where the tsars and their people stand together in 
some form of spiritual, superhuman unity. Paradoxically, 
the conservatives are being helped by a large majority of 
the liberals, who never tire of deploring the barbarianism 
they see around themselves. Instead of conceptualising 
Russia’s difference in institutional and historicist terms, 
as an outcome of a specific pattern of deferred modern-
isation, Russian Westernisers essentialise this difference 
as a cultural phenomenon, by attributing it to the per-
sistence of ‘peasant consciousness’, ‘Soviet mentality’ or 
‘the authoritarian Russian mind’. From such essential-
ism, there is only one step to supporting the regime as 
something that the Russians actually deserve.
It must be emphasised that while it is the elites who 
determine the course of the country, the identity dis-
course behind those decisions is shared by the entire 
society. In other words, it is not just the leaders who 
do not trust the masses: in a way, the entire Russian 
people do not trust themselves. Everyone is eager to 
repeat the clichés about Russia being a radically, irra-
tionally deviant case. Whether this allegation is taken 
with gloomy pessimism or self-indulging elation is of 
secondary importance. Inter alia, this explains the effec-
tiveness of the official propaganda: it is not that every-
one believes everything the TV tells them to be true, but 
most people would say that some brainwashing is nec-
essary for the sake of disciplining fellow citizens, who 
otherwise might get out of control.
Conclusion
There are limits to the extent to which a modern power 
with a claim to global leadership can engage in attempts 
at persuading its population that they are better off as 
uncivilised natives rather than as modern citizenry. For 
one, embracing spiritual values might be fine as long as 
most people still have access to the benefits of modern 
civilisation, but radical traditionalists are constantly try-
ing to question that. Among the potentially explosive 
issues are the right to abortion or access to modern com-
munication technologies, both of which in different ways 
could seriously affect large segments of the population.
Even more important is the fact that the Russian 
state seems to be at a peak of its international engage-
ment, being involved in the conflicts in Ukraine and 
Syria as well as in the global standoff with the West. 
There is an obvious risk of imperial overstretch not 
unlike those which brought down the Russian empire 
and the Soviet Union. In combination with the struc-
tural economic crisis and a decline in the oil price, this 
means the need to mobilise all available resources. Even-
tually—and this is acknowledged by the authorities—
making Russia great again necessitates an economic and 
technological modernisation.
If modernisation is indeed a necessity, the conserva-
tive turn might be useful for societal mobilisation, but 
its short-term benefits are clearly offset by the backward 
movement in the development of education, health care 
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and other key elements of social infrastructure. In other 
words, if the state persists in its promotion of ‘tradi-
tional values’, it will perpetuate the technological and 
institutional gap between Russia and the developed 
world, which will inevitably have consequences in the 
field of foreign policy. The ‘whip of external necessity’ 
is bound to strike again, although it might take time 
before that happens.
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